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1793 - 1815. 
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Between 1794 and 1815 Britain occupied no less than eighteen islands 
in the Mediterranean, though several were very small indeed (Cap raja, 
Lampedusa, Camino, Cerigo and Ithaca, for instance). Most were held 
until the wars ended, though some were given up earlier: Corsica in 1796, 
Elba in 1797, Minorca in 1802, Capri in 1800 and Ischia and Procida in 
1809. 
Can any common purpose or purposes be discerned in this amazing 
dispersal of effort? First, there was the quest for a sovereign base from which 
the navy could operate to safeguard trade in the Mediterranean. Second, 
there was the wish to save Italy from falling into the grips of France and, 
when this became impossible to attempt a recovery of that peninsula in 
cooperation with Austria and Russia. Third, there was the determination to 
preserve Egypt, the route to British possessions in India and ultimately the 
whole Turkish empire, from conquest from Napoleon, by the occupation of 
strategically placed islands. 
Soon after the outbreak of the war with France, a British fleet under 
Admiral Hood was sent by Pitt to the Mediterranean. Hood's instructions 
were to bolster morale of states bordering on that sea who were al ready at 
war with France or seemed to be threatened by her aggression; give them 
such naval and military assistance as the fleet and a small British army could 
afford; disrupt all French seaborne trade, while protecting that of the allies; 
and attack the French fleet when occasion offered. 1 
After the allies were forced out ofToulon in December 1793 - the 
base having been surrendered to Hood by the French royalists during the 
summer - Hood and his forces seized Corsica, at the invitation of the 
Corsicans. Corsica provided the British with harbours, a base well placed 
from which to watch Toulon and the remnant of the French republican 
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fleet, and support the armies of Austria and Sardinia on the mainland of 
north Italy. Cap raj a and Elba were also seized. But in October 1796 the 
British were forced to withdraw from Corsica and Capraja, and from Elba 
in April of the following year, due to Napoleon's victories in Italy. 
The Corsican episode had been unpopular in Britain. An experiment 
in granting a constitution (liberal by the standards of the time) and the 
creation of a joint kingdom under a British Viceroy (and not the Corsican 
leader Paoli) had not appealed to the Corsicans as a whole, and their refusal 
to pay taxes led to a widespread and successful revolt. This failed venture in 
colonial rule was to colour the views of British statesmen when, in 1812, 
they had to decide on Malta's future form of Government. 
In November 1798, after the British fleet had again entered the 
Mediterranean (having been absent for two years) and Nelson had destroyed 
the French fleet at the battle of Aboukir Bay, the British occupied Minorca 
(Spain now being an ally of France). Minorca, which had been a British 
colony for much of the eighteenth century, until it was returned to Spain at 
the end of the Anlerican War, has a tine harbour at Port Mahon. It was 
much valued by British admirals who were given the task of watching Toulon, 
though with France and Spain both at war with Britain it remained a liability, 
needing the constant presence of the navy to ensure it remained inviolate. 
Though its repossession was clearly important in the war to dominate the 
Mediterranean, now that Corsica was lost, the reason for its capture was not 
(curiously) naval. Dundas, the secretary of state for war in William Pitt's 
administration, wanted to distract the attention of Spain from a projected 
invasion of Portugal, whose harbour Lisbon, at the mouth of the Tagus, was 
of vital importance to British trade. 2 The island was given back to Spain at 
the Treaty of Amiens in 1802. By that time the much tlner harbour of 
Valletta had been in British hands for eighteen months. 
Naval opinion differed sharply on the relative importance of Minorca 
and Malta for the performance of the navy's tasks in the Mediterranean 
theatre of war. Captain Alexander Ball and Admiral Lord Keith both strongly 
favoured Malta, as did General Sir Ralph Abercromby, as being more easily 
definable and a place where good water was more plentiful and the cost of 
provisions notably cheaper.3 The island was given back to Spain at the 
treaty of Amiens in 1802. By that time the much tlner harbour ofValletta 
had been in British hands tor eighteen months. Nelson however thought 
Malta useless tor his purpose. He told the prime minister in 1803 that 
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"Minorca may have its inconveniences, but its conveniences are so great, 
that trust at the moment a Spanish war is certain, that we shall be able to 
secure it." Malta, on the other hand he considered" a perfectly useless place 
to refit in" or one from which to procure refreshments, owing to its distance 
from the waters offToulon and the prevalence of unfavourable winds. 4 Pitt, 
in 1805, pressure from the Tzar to give back Malta to the Knights, toyed 
temporarily with the idea of advised him strongly against. When in 1808 
Spain rose in revolt against the occupation of the French, and offered the 
facilities of Port Mahon once again to the British fleet, Minorca, though 
not occupied by the British, became an important British base. Admiral 
Cotton, commanding the fleet wrote to the admiralty in 1811 that it was 
vital to retain the use of Minorca. "The fleet in Toulon cannot be efficiently 
watched, or the blockade at all kept, without the advan tage of this island". 5 
Malta came into British hands at the surrender of General Vaubois of 
the port ofYalletta in September 1800. In giving naval and military assistance 
to the Maltese in revolt against the French, Britain was primarily interested 
in denying the island to France. It had been discussed by Napoleon, who 
seized it, as "the watch-tower of the Mediterranean". During the course of 
the siege, Britain had agreed with the Tzar that, at the peace, the Maltese 
islands would be handed back to the knights of St. John, the Tzar being by 
then elected as their head. Grenville, Pitt's Foreign secretary, had been 
responsible for this arrangement, having no very great opinion of the 
importance of Malta to Britain, though Dundas, the secretary of state for 
war, profoundly disagreed on this point.6 In 1802 the new ministry under 
Addington honoured the previous British commitment at the Peace of 
Amiens in 1802. The settlement was intended by the government to keep 
the island in neutral hands and prevent them falling to the French once 
again. Once it became clear that Napoleon had not relinquished his designs 
on Egypt, to which Malta was a necessary stepping-stone, and so to designs 
on the British in India, Britain decided to renege on the treaty. Her continued 
occupation of Malta was a purely defensive measure. 
It was only after 1806 (Napoleon's Berlin Decree) and the 
intensification of the economic war, that Britain looked at Malta in a new 
light - a base for smuggling her manufactures and colonial produce through 
Napoleon's blockade. The prosperity that Malta then began to enjoy as a 
result of pursuing this plan induced the British government in 1812 to 
annex Malta as a crown colony. Not only was Malta a colony that looked 
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able to pay its way (a consideration of importance to the Westminster 
Parliament), but "a place of eminent importance as the central point of a 
great commerce, and the seat of English influence in the Mediterranean" 
(words of the Under Secretary of State to Sir Thomas Maitland, the new 
Governor of Malta)? 
Malta and Sicily were interdependent. The latter was occupied by 
the British in February 1806 with the consent of the king of Naples, after a 
small British army had been forced to evacuate the kingdom of Naples. It 
had been hoped that, with Russian assistance, the French could be driven of 
Italy, but Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz had effectively put paid to all that. 
By agreement with Ferdinand the king of Naples(then in exile in Palermo) 
to whom the British paid an annual subsidy, Britain retained in Sicily a 
force of never less than 10,000 and sometimes as large as 20,000 troops. 
The aim was to keep a military base from which to launch attacks on Italy 
with the assistance of the Austrians and Russians, and to be able to exert 
influence on policy of the Ottoman Empire. Little ever came of the formed 
alliance, save a brief occupation of several islands situated in the Bay of 
Naples, though Capri was held for two years, as a kind oflistening-post on 
Europe. The latter aim led only in 1807 to two highly successful expeditions 
- a military one to Egypt, and a naval one to the Dardanelles. 
Sicily, like Malta, was useful to Britain as a base tor trading contraband 
to the mainland; it was also vital as a source of supply of essential food and 
drink tor Malta. If Sicily ever tell to the French, the British could not have 
remained in Malta. The British government in 1806 were right to refuse 
napoleon's off-er to recognize British possession of Malta if they handed over 
Sicily. Sicily also had useful ports, and both Collingwood and Cotton, the 
otlicers who successively commanded the British fleet in the Mediterranean 
from 1805 to 1812 used Sicily's harbours extensively during the middle 
years of the war. 
In 1809 Collingwood arranged for the occupation of the southern 
five Ionian Islands - the sixth followed in 1810. The aim was to safeguard 
the mainland of Greece, then part of the Ottoman Empire. Napoleon had 
obtained these islands from Russia at the Treaty ofTilsit in 1807 and had 
strongly fortified Corfu. His occupation of the province of IIIyria, taken 
from Austria in 1809, seemed to Collingwood to pose a series threat to 
Constantinople. The British command in the Mediterranean would like to 
have gone on to assault Corfu, were reinforcements made available, but the 
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government in London was opposed, stressing that nothing must 
compromise the continued retention of Sicily and Malta. 8 
Once it became obvious that Britain's main effort on land against 
Napoleon must be made in the Iberian peninsula, and that Napoleon's 
attentions were now focused on Spain and Russia, not the Mediterranean, 
the government in London lost interest in its islands and their garrisons, 
save as sources of reinforcements for Wellington. Troops were sent to him 
from Sicily and Malta in 1811 and 1812. The fear of a French attack on 
Sicily had subsided after 1810 and Murat's abortive assault on the island, 
while Malta was never considered imperiled, save by a revolt of the Maltese 
themselves. 
Due to the exigencies of war, all the Mediterranean islands occupied 
by Britain were governed as military fortresses (save only Corsica), and 
although civil commissioners were appointed to head the islands' 
administration, those civil commissioners were infact generals or, one case, 
a naval captain/Rear Admiral. Sicily was not a British possession but its 
king was persuaded, against his wishes to adopt a British-style constitution. 
It did not work and, by 1812, the British minister, who was also commander 
of all land forces in the Mediterranean, found himselfin a position of having 
to act <;lS an Oliver Cromwell. 
There was never any long term government strategy during the course 
of the wars against France between 1793 and 1815, to enlarge Britain's empire 
in the Mediterranean, though there were individuals who favoured such a 
policy. One was Henry Dundas who died in 1811; another was the writer 
Francis Gould Leckie who, in his Historical Survey of the Foreign Affairs of 
Great Britain, published in 1808, advocated Britain annexing the principal 
islands of the Mediterranean;9 and Lord William Bentinck, the commander 
in Sicily and British minister of the court of Palermo, when disillusioned by 
the Sicilians' failure to work the constitution he had wished on them, 
suggested at one stage that Sicily should be made a part of the British Empire, 
though he Shortly after disowned his plan. lo 
When the war with Napoleon finally ended, only Malta was retained 
as a colony, for reasons already mentioned. The Ionian Islands became a 
British Protectorate, but only because the Allied Powers were unable to agree 
a better solution. The Admiralty never favoured Corfu or developed it as a 
naval base. It was in Malta alone that they were interested, as was the British 
government, and so remained fi)r a century and a half. 
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